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Religion is commonly defined as a set of rules, developed as part of a culture. Here we provide 
evidence that practice in following these rules systematically changes the way people allocate 
their attention, as indicated by the attentional blink (AB), a deficit in reporting the second of 
two target stimuli presented in close succession in a rapid sequence of distracters. We provide 
evidence that Dutch Calvinists and Atheists, brought up in the same country and culture and 
controlled for race, intelligence, mood, personality traits, and age, differ with respect to the 
amount of resources invested into processing AB targets. Calvinists showed a larger AB than 
Atheists, which is consistent with the notion that people’s attentional processing style reflects 
biases rewarded by their religious beliefs.
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and Mexico (cf., Hofstede, 2001). Japan, in   contrast, is one of the 
Asian countries with the most   individualistic culture. Thus it seems 
difficult to capture the essence of a culture by studying citizens of a 
particular country (which often live and represent different cultures) 
and to generalize from one country to its regional neighbors (e.g., to 
China, which is considered much more collectivistic than Japan; cf., 
Hofstede, 2001). In the absence of an unequivocal and straightfor-
ward definition of what a culture is and what it implies, it is difficult 
to derive clear-cut predictions of how culture might affect human 
cognition. Social systems that seem to be better suited for that purpose 
are religions (Colzato et al., in press). Even though not all religions are 
institutionally organized, regulated, and constrained by specific rules, 
a number of influential and widespread religions are, such as Judaism, 
Christianity, and Islam. At least for these religions it is thus possible 
to define with reasonable precision what rules and expectations the 
behavior of a believing member would have to meet.
Like cultures, religions differ with respect to the emphasis they 
put on the importance and responsibility of the individual versus 
the group. Accordingly, one could expect that religious practice 
should have a systematic impact on cognitive processes. Indeed 
recent observations are consistent with this expectation. Colzato 
et al. (2008c) compared Dutch neo-Calvinists and Atheists, brought 
up and living in the same country and controlled for various vari-
ables, in their performance on the global–local task (Navon, 1977) 
– a task that has been used in many cultural studies (e.g., Masuda 
and Nisbett, 2001). In this task, participants are presented with 
large rectangles and squares made of either smaller rectangles or 
smaller squares, and they carry out speeded choice responses to 
the shape of either the global figure or its local elements. Both 
neo-Calvinists and Atheists responded faster to the global than the 
local shapes, thus producing the well-known global-precedence 
IntroductIon
Religion is commonly defined as a set of beliefs (a sort of   framework) 
developed as part of a culture, which gives practitioners the experi-
ence that their life is meaningful. The idea that cultural experience 
might affect our perception and attention has been suggested by 
studies on cultural differences. For instance, Masuda and Nisbett 
(2001) observed that people growing up in Asian cultures exhibit 
a more holistic perceptual style (i.e., are more responsive to the 
global than to local features of visual objects or scenes) than peo-
ple growing up in the North American culture. Westerners seem 
to focus on salient objects while East Asians attend more to the 
relationships between objects and background elements or context 
(Nisbett and Masuda, 2003; Nisbett and Miyamoto, 2005). This 
fits with the observation that East Asians allocate their attention 
more broadly across space than do Americans (Boduroglu et al., 
2009). Researchers attribute these differences to culturally guided 
learning experience associated with selective reward for responses 
and actions that reflect culturally important values. The idea is that 
Western cultures often emphasize the individual and individual 
goals and needs, whereas Eastern Asian cultures emphasize the 
importance of the group and the social embedding of the individual 
in the group context (Nisbett and Miyamoto, 2005).
Even though culture apparently is an important determinant of 
inter-individual and inter-group differences, the cultural context is 
very hard to define (Colzato et al., in press). For instance, many inter-
cultural comparisons of what is considered “Western” and “Eastern-
Asian” cultures have evaluated US Americans in relation to Japanese. 
US Americans are composed of various cultural and national back-
grounds, ranging from countries with particularly individualistic 
cultures, like the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, to countries 
with a particularly strong emphasis on collectivism, such as Greece 
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performance on T2 increases, sometimes even dramatically, when 
T1 and T2 are presented in a longer sequence of multiple tar-
gets (Di Lollo et al., 2005), if participants are assuming a relaxed 
attitude towards the task (Olivers and Nieuwenhuis, 2005), or if 
they are monolingual, rather than bilingual (Colzato et al., 2008a). 
In particular, Dale and Arnell (2010) found a negative correla-
tion between global precedence and AB magnitude: people who 
have a disposition towards processing local, rather than global 
information, showed a greater AB magnitude. These observations 
suggest that individuals can exert control over the allocation of 
attention when processing targets. Indeed, electrophysiological 
and magnetoencephalographic markers of attentional processes 
were found to be very sensitive to experimental manipulations of 
participants’ expectations regarding the timing and probability of 
target presentations in AB tasks (Martens and Johnson, 2005; Gross 
et al., 2006; Martens et al., 2006b; Akyürek et al., 2007). In addi-
tion, Shapiro et al. (2006) provided evidence that the individual 
size of the AB is predicted by the amount of attentional resources 
devoted to T1 processing (as indicated by the individual ampli-
tude of the M3, the magnetoencephalographic equivalent of the 
electrophysiological P3). Interestingly, even though more resources 
were allocated to T1, T1 accuracy did not improve, suggesting that 
humans may overinvest attentional resources into T1 processing, 
in turn impairing T2 performance (Olivers and Nieuwenhuis, 
2005, 2006; Taatgen et al., 2009). This model is consistent with 
the findings from other studies on individual differences, which 
consistently show effects on T2 but not T1 report (e.g., Martens 
et al., 2006a; Colzato et al., 2007, 2008a,b; Martens and Valchev, 
2009; Dale and Arnell, 2010).
How can the observed individual differences be explained and 
what would the explanation imply for the possible impact of 
religion on attentional control? Consider the typical way neu-
ral decision-making is modeled. Making a decision between the 
alternatives A and B – be that responses to perform or stimulus 
representations to select for further processing – is commonly 
assumed to involve competition between the representations of 
the alternatives, as indicated by the mutual inhibitory links in 
Figure 1, and some sort of top–down support for the alternative 
that fits the current goals best (for a review, see Bogacz, 2007). If 
we follow the widespread assumption that experience and practice 
operates on the associations between cognitive representations 
rather than on the representations themselves (Hebb, 1949), this 
setup leaves two, not mutually exclusive types of associations 
that experience could modify: the strength to which top–down 
operating systems bias decision-making towards the most goal-
consistent alternative (connection 1 in Figure 1) and the strength 
of the inhibitory links between the alternatives (connection 2). 
Having participants to relax (Olivers and Nieuwenhuis, 2005), 
to attend to a longer series of sequential targets (Di Lollo et al., 
2005), or to meditate (Slagter et al., 2007) is likely to reduce the 
strength of top–down support for one particular target and/or 
the degree of mutual inhibition between alternatives. This would 
amount to spreading attentional resources more equally among 
competing candidates, which would mean that selecting A would 
lead to less inhibition of B. If we consider T1 and a temporally 
close T2 (just as a distractor) as competitors (an assumption 
that is suggested by findings of Potter et al., 2002; Hommel and 
effect (i.e., people see the forest before the trees: Navon, 1977). 
However, Calvinists showed a significantly less pronounced global 
precedence effect than Atheists. Given that neo-Calvinism is based 
on the so-called pillar concept of human society – where everyone 
should mind his/her own business and not judge others (cf., Bratt, 
1998) – this outcome pattern was predicted: learning to systemati-
cally neglect one’s broader social context to at least some degree 
should systematically shift the attentional focus from the context 
to the local detail.
Continuous exercise in controlling one’s attention accordingly, in 
order to produce behavior that is rewarded by one’s peer group, can 
be expected to establish “default values” used for attentional control 
settings that generalize to non-religious contexts (Hommel and 
Colzato, 2010). In other words, religious practice that systematically 
directs attention to local, rather than global, information might 
induce a chronic bias towards local processing. If so, one would 
expect that religions emphasizing the global social context, such 
as Judaism and Catholicism, induced a comparatively more global 
attentional bias. The recent study of Colzato et al. (in press) pro-
vides evidence that this is indeed the case: Italian Roman Catholics 
and Israeli Orthodox Jews showed a larger global precedence effect 
than Italian and Israeli seculars (baptized individuals who are not 
concerned with or devoted to religion), respectively. Hence, it is 
not just religious belief that matters (as argued by McCullough and 
Willoughby, 2009) but religious practice that has a specific impact 
on attentional control.
Although it is important to demonstrate that religion affects 
performance in a global–local task – the preferred diagnostic of 
the reviewed inter-cultural studies – it is even more important to 
demonstrate that the impact of religion affects attentional control 
more broadly. Toward this goal the present study was designed to 
test whether religion would not only affect the relative allocation of 
attention to the global versus local elements of hierarchically con-
structed stimuli, as assessed by the global–local task, but also impact 
the allocation of attention. A widely accepted tool to assess the 
allocation of attention over time is the so-called attentional blink 
(AB) task (Raymond et al., 1992). The AB occurs if two masked 
(or otherwise difficult to identify) target stimuli appear in close 
temporal proximity, such as in tasks using rapid serial visual pres-
entation (RSVP): Whereas the first target (T1) is typically easy to 
report accurately, report of the second target (T2) is dramatically 
impaired if it follows T1 within 100–500 ms.
The most prominent capacity-limited account of AB refers to 
limited attentional resources (Chun and Potter, 1995; Jolicoeur and 
Dell’Acqua, 1998; Vogel et al., 1998; for a recent review, see Dux and 
Marois, 2009). According to these theories the AB is due to some 
sort of processing bottleneck: reporting a stimulus presupposes 
that its sensory representation is transferred to, and consolidated 
in WM, a process that is assumed to draw on attentional resources 
that are occupied for processing T1. In particular, Dux and Marois 
(2009) suggested that AB arises from attentional demands of T1 
for selection, working memory encoding, episodic registration, and 
response selection, which prevents this high-level central resource 
from being applied to T2 at short T1–T2 lags.
Even though the AB is a robust phenomenon, there is mounting 
evidence for the role of strategic-, experience-related individual 
differences in modulating the severity of the AB. For instance, www.frontiersin.org  September 2010  | Volume 1  | Article 147  |  3
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MaterIals and Methods
PartIcIPants
The sample included 40 healthy subjects (25 male and 15 female) 
between 18 and 30 years of age. Half of the participants reported to 
be Calvinists (active members of the “Gereformeerde Gemeenten” 
and “Gereformeerde Vrijgemaakt” Church) and the other half to 
be Atheists  (non-baptized).  Members  of  the  two  groups  were 
matched for race (100% Caucasian), culture (100% Dutch), age, 
sex, and IQ (measured by Raven’s standard progressive matrices, 
SPM), educational style (Dutch VWO) and socio-economic situ-
ation (see Table 1). Participants were recruited by advertisements 
and snowball technique. Written informed consent was obtained 
from all participants after the nature of the study was explained to 
them; the protocol and the remuneration arrangements of 8 Euro 
was approved by the institutional review board (Leiden University, 
Institute for Psychological Research).
aPParatus and stIMulI
The experiment was controlled by a Targa Pentium III computer. 
All stimuli were presented in a resolution of 800 × 600 pixels in 
16-bit color on a 17′ CRT refreshing at 100 Hz. Participants were 
seated at a viewing distance of about 50 cm. The fixation mark 
(“+”), as well as all RSVP items were presented centrally in black 
on a gray background (RGB 128, 128, 128). Each item was set in 
16 point Times New Roman font. RSVP items included letters and 
digits. Letters were drawn randomly without replacement from the 
alphabet. Digits were drawn randomly from the set 1–9.
Procedure and desIgn
All participants were tested individually and completed the intel-
ligence test, the affect grid, the Eysenck’s personality questionnaire 
(EPQ-RSS) and the RSVP experiment.
Individual IQ was determined by means of a 30-min reasoning-
based intelligence test (Raven’s SPM; Raven et al., 1988). The SPM 
assesses the individual’s ability to create perceptual relations and to 
reason by analogy independent of language and formal schooling; 
it is a standard, widely used test to measure Spearman’s g factor 
and of fluid intelligence in particular.
Akyürek, 2005), this scenario would correctly predict that T2 
processing suffers less under these conditions, so that the AB 
should be indeed reduced.
Extending this logic to practice suggests that being rewarded for 
behavior that relies on a particular configuration of top–down sup-
port and/or mutual inhibition between alternatives might induce a 
chronic bias towards this configuration. Evidence for this possibility 
comes from research on the cognitive effects of bilingualism. Other 
than monolingual, bilinguals and multilinguals are continuously 
facing the problem of cognitively keeping the languages they master 
apart, so to prevent mixing up words from different languages in 
the same sentence or utterance (Bialystok and Craik, 2010). Colzato 
et al. (2008a) suggested that this might lead to a relatively “exclusive” 
configuration of attentional control parameters, which amounts 
to a relatively strong top–down support for words from the cur-
rently spoken language and relatively strong local inhibition of 
words from other languages. If that configuration would become 
chronic, so the idea of Colzato et al. (2008a), it should generalize to 
other tasks, such as the AB task. An “exclusive” configuration would 
then be expected to lead to stronger inhibition of competitors of 
T1 – such as a temporally close T2. This predicts a stronger AB in 
bilinguals than in monolinguals, which was exactly the pattern 
that Colzato et al. (2008a) observed. Applying these considera-
tions to Calvinists would result in exactly the same prediction: If 
we consider that Calvinism favors a local attentional focus over 
the processing of the broader context and if we assume that this 
induces a chronic, generalizable bias towards a more “exclusive” 
attentional control configuration, Calvinists should show a deeper 
AB. We tested this prediction by comparing Calvinists and Atheists 
in a standard AB paradigm.
Figure 1 | Possible mechanisms involved in decision-making. The 
goal-relevant alternative A is supported by the goal representation (1) but 
competes with choice alternative B through mutual inhibition (2).
Table 1 | Demographic characteristics of participants.
Sample  Calvinists  Atheists 
Sex n (M:F) ns  20 (15:5)  20 (10:10)
Age (years) ns  22.7 (3.6)  21.4 (2.5)
Raven IQns  120.5 (3.2)  120.2 (2.7)
AFFeCT
Arousalns  5.9 (1.2)  6.2 (1.6)
Moodns  6.3 (1.3)  6.5 (1.3)
PerSonAliTy
Extraversionns  9.3 (2.7)  9.3 (2.7)
Psychotismns  2.4 (1.5)  3.2 (2.9)
Neuroticismns  4.9 (2.8)  5.1 (2.8)
Baptized (or similar)  20 (0)  0 (0)
Daily prayers  4.1 (1.1)  0 (0)
Weekly church visits  1.8 (0.4)  0 (0)
Standard deviations in parentheses. ns, non-significant difference.Frontiers in Psychology  |  Cognition    September 2010  | Volume 1  | Article 147  |  4
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T2 immediately followed T1. This pattern is often observed if T1 
and T2 belong to the same category (e.g., digits) and satisfy the 
same selection criteria, and when the presentation rate is fast. These 
conditions are thought to increase the competition between T1 
and T2 representations if they occur close in time, with T2 outper-
forming T1 more often (Potter et al., 2002; Hommel and Akyürek, 
2005; Colzato et al., 2007). Consistent with previous observations 
(Colzato et al., 2008a; Dale and Arnell, 2010), Group did not 
affect T1 performance, F(3,114) = 1.57, p = 0.21, MSE = 0.002, 
η2 p = 0.04.
More  importantly,  the ANOVA  of  conditional  T2  accuracy 
(T2|T1)  revealed  a  significant  lag  effect,  F(3,114)  =  145.63, 
p < 0.0001, MSE = 0.004, η2 p = 0.79, indicating a marked AB with 
good performance at Lag 1 (Lag-1 sparing, Visser et al., 1999) and 
a considerable attenuation at Lags 3 and 5 (see Figures 3 and 4 
for individual AB magnitude). As predicted, Group impacted the 
blink size, as indicated by a two-way interaction between group and 
lag, F(3,114) = 5.41, p < 0.05, MSE = 0.004, η2 p = 0.12: Calvinists 
showed a greater AB magnitude than Atheists. Moreover, daily 
prayers positively correlated with AB magnitude, r(20) = 0.514 
p < 0.05, while weekly church visit even though it followed the 
same trend, did not. Hence, more daily prayers are associated with 
greater AB magnitude, see Figure 5.
conclusIons
The aim of this study was to investigate whether Calvinists and 
Atheists differ in the way they allocate their attention, as revealed 
by a task known to index the allocation of attention over time. 
The affect grid is a single-items scale that measures affect along 
the dimensions of unpleasant/pleasant feelings and arousal/sleepi-
ness (Russell et al., 1989). We used the affect grid in order to control 
for mood and arousal given that these factors have been shown to 
influence the AB phenomenon: T2 accuracy was highest for partici-
pants with low arousal and negative affect (Jefferies et al., 2008).
Participants were asked to put a mark in the grid in order to indi-
cate their feelings at the present moment. The vertical dimension 
represented the degree of arousal versus sleepiness while the hori-
zontal dimension represents unpleasant versus pleasant feelings.
The EPQ-RSS questionnaire consists of 48 yes/no questions that 
measure extraversion, neuroticism and psychoticism traits of per-
sonality (Eysenck et al., 1985). We controlled for personality traits 
because it has been shown that more extravert individuals tend to 
show an enhanced global attentional scope compared to neurotic 
individuals (Kossowksa and Necka, 1994).
In the RSVP task adopted from Colzato et al. (2007), participants 
had to identify and report two digits (T1 and T2) presented in a 
rapid stream of letter distractors. After reading the instructions, 
which included a slow demonstration of the RSVP, and indicating 
to have fully understood the task, participants were required to 
undergo 24 trials of training. If more than 50% of the responses 
were incorrect during the training, the training part was automati-
cally restarted. A fixation “+” sign, which was shown for 2000 ms, 
marked the beginning of each trial. After a blank interval of 250 ms, 
the RSVP commenced, consisting of 20 items with a duration of 
70 ms each and an inter-stimulus interval of 30 ms.
The occurrence of T1 in the stimulus stream was varied ran-
domly between positions 7, 8, and 9 to reduce the predictability 
of first target onset. T2 was presented directly after T1 (lag 1), or 
after another 2, 4, or 7 distracters (lag 3, 5, and 8, respectively), see 
Figure 2. Both targets were to be reported directly (order of report 
was not considered) after the RSVP – the question being “which two 
targets did you see?”– by pressing the corresponding digit keys. A 
full experimental session lasted 10 min and contained one block of 
144 trials (three locations of T1 × four lags × 12 repetitions).
statIstIcal analysIs
Independent samples t-tests were performed to test age, mood, 
personality traits, and IQ differences between the groups. T1 and T2 
accuracy data were submitted to separate ANOVAs with lag (1, 3, 5, 
and 8) as a within-participants factor and Group (Calvinists versus 
Atheists) as a between-participant factor. T2 accuracy was based 
only on those trials in which T1 was correctly reported (T2|T1). 
To test whether the AB magnitude (measured as T2|T1 at Lag 8 
minus T2|T1 at Lag 3) is proportional to the religious practice we 
computed Pearson correlation coefficients between the AB mag-
nitude, daily prayers and weekly church visit. A significance level 
of p < 0.05 was adopted for all statistical tests.
results and dIscussIon
No significant group differences were obtained for age, mood, per-
sonality traits and IQ, see Table 1.
T1 accuracy is shown in Figure 3. The ANOVA with lag as within-
participant factor showed a significant lag effect, F(3,114) = 24.47, 
p < 0.0001, MSE = 0.002, η2 p = 0.39. As Figure 3 shows, this 
effect was due to a reduction in performance at Lag 1, i.e., when 
Figure 2 | example of an rSVP trial. On every trial, 20 items were 
presented at the center of the screen, preceded by a 2,000-ms fixation cross. 
Most of the items were letters, presented for 70 ms each and followed by a 
30-ms blank. Participants had to detect two target numbers (T1 and T2) 
among the items. T1 and T2 were separated by one, three, five, or eight 
non-target items, defining the lag. T1 was presented at position 7 , 8, and 9 of 
the stimulus stream.www.frontiersin.org  September 2010  | Volume 1  | Article 147  |  5
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Figure 4 | AB magnitude for each individual member of the two groups.
Figure 3 | T1 (unconditional) performance (left panel) and T2 performance given T1 correct (T2|T1) (right panel), shown separately for each lag and for 
T2|T1 for Atheists and Calvinists.
As predicted, the AB phenomenon was modified as a function of 
religious belief: Calvinists showed a more pronounced AB than 
Atheists. We have argued that becoming a good Calvinist involves 
adopting behavior that conforms to Calvinist rules and expecta-
tions, which is likely to be achieved by focusing on a narrower, as 
opposed to broader context. This, we assume, creates a chronic bias 
in an underlying attentional control setting, in turn generalizing 
to a style of information processing in cognitive tasks (Colzato 
et al., 2008c; Colzato et al., in press; Hommel and Colzato, 2010). 
As described in section “Introduction”, this processing style was 
predicted to result in a larger blink in Calvinists, as our findings 
demonstrate. Moreover, our results are in line with the study by 
Dale and Arnell (2010), who found that individuals who have a 
disposition towards processing local rather than global informa-
tion, as also in the case of Calvinists (Colzato et al., 2008c; Colzato 
et al., in press), showed a greater AB magnitude.Frontiers in Psychology  |  Cognition    September 2010  | Volume 1  | Article 147  |  6
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